305 research outputs found
Crypto at the Time of Surveillance: Sharing with the Cloud
These days as we are facing extremely powerful attacks on servers over the Internet (say, by the Advanced Persistent Threat attackers or by Surveillance by powerful adversary), Shamir has claimed that âCryptography is Ineffectiveâand some understood it as âCryptography is Dead!â In this talk I will discuss the implications on cryptographic systems design while facing such strong adversaries. Is crypto dead or we need to design it better, taking into account, mathematical constraints, but also systems vulnerability constraints. Can crypto be effective at all when your computer or your cloud is penetrated? What is lost and what can be saved? These are very basic issues at this point of time, when we are facing potential loss of privacy and security
Concurrent Knowledge-Extraction in the Public-Key Model
Knowledge extraction is a fundamental notion, modelling machine possession of
values (witnesses) in a computational complexity sense. The notion provides an
essential tool for cryptographic protocol design and analysis, enabling one to
argue about the internal state of protocol players without ever looking at this
supposedly secret state. However, when transactions are concurrent (e.g., over
the Internet) with players possessing public-keys (as is common in
cryptography), assuring that entities ``know'' what they claim to know, where
adversaries may be well coordinated across different transactions, turns out to
be much more subtle and in need of re-examination. Here, we investigate how to
formally treat knowledge possession by parties (with registered public-keys)
interacting over the Internet. Stated more technically, we look into the
relative power of the notion of ``concurrent knowledge-extraction'' (CKE) in
the concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) bare public-key (BPK) model.Comment: 38 pages, 4 figure
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Minimum-Knowledge Interactive Proofs for Decision Problems
Interactive communication of knowledge from the point of view of resource-bounded computational complexity is studied. Extending the work of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackof [Proc. 17th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 1985, pp. 291ââ304; .,18 (1989), pp. 186ââ208], the authors define a protocol transferring the result of any fixed computation to be minimum-knowledge if it communicates no additional knowledge to the recipient besides the intended computational result. It is proved that such protocols may be combined in a natural way so as to build more complex protocols. A protocol is introduced for two parties, a prover and a verifier, with the following properties:(1) Following the protocol, the prover gives to the verifier a proof of the value, 0 or 1, of a particular Boolean predicate, which is (assumed to be) hard for the verifier to compute. Such a deciding âinteractive proof-systemâ extends the interactive proof-systems of [op. cit.], which are used only to confirm that a certain predicate has value 1. (2) The protocol is minimum-knowledge. (3) The protocol is result-indistinguishable: an eavesdropper, overhearing an execution of the protocol, does not learn the value of the predicate that is proved. The value of the predicate is a cryptographically secure bit, shared by the two parties to the protocol. This security is achieved without the use of encryption functions, all messages being sent in the clear. These properties enable one to define a cryptosystem in which each user receives exactly the knowledge he is supposed to receive, and nothing more
A Private Interactive Test of a Boolean Predicate and Minimum-Knowledge Public-Key Cryptosystems
We introduce a new two-party protocol with the following properties: 1. The protocol gives a proof of the value, 0 or 1, of a particular Boolean predicate which is (assumed to be) hard to compute. This extends the 'interactive proof systems' of (7), which are only used to prove that a certain predicate has value 1. 2. The protocol is provably minimum-knowledge ill the sense that it communicates no additional knowledge (besides the value of the predicate) that might be used, for example, to compromise the private key of a user of a public-key cryptosystem. 3. The protocol is result-indistinguishable: an eavesdropper, overhearing an execution of the protocol, does not know the value of the predicate that was proved. This bit is cryptographically secure. The protocol achieves this without the use of encryption functions, all messages being sent in the clear. These properties enable us to define a minimum-knowledge cryptosystem, in which each user receives exactly the knowledge he is supposed to receive and nothing more. In particular, the system is provably secure against both chosen-message and chosen-ciphertext attack. Moreover, extending the Diffie-Hellman model, it allows a user to encode messages to other users with his own public key. This enables a symmetric use of public-key encryption
Functional Commitment Schemes: From Polynomial Commitments to Pairing-Based Accumulators from Simple Assumptions
International audienceWe formalize a cryptographic primitive called functional commitment (FC) which can be viewed as a generalization of vector commitments (VCs), polynomial commitments and many other special kinds of commitment schemes. A non-interactive functional commitment allows committing to a message in such a way that the committer has the flexibility of only revealing a function F (M) of the committed message during the opening phase. We provide constructions for the functionality of linear functions, where messages consist of a vectors of n elements over some domain D (e.g., m = (m_1,. .. , m_n) â D_n) and commitments can later be opened to a specific linear function of the vector coordinates. An opening for a function F : D_n â R thus generates a witness for the fact that F (m) indeed evaluates to y â R. One security requirement is called function binding and requires that no adversary be able to open a commitment to two different evaluations y, y for the same function F. We propose a construction of functional commitment for linear functions based on constant-size assumptions in composite order groups endowed with a bilinear map. The construction has commitments and openings of constant size (i.e., independent of n or function description) and is perfectly hiding â the underlying message is information theoretically hidden. Our security proofs builds on the DĂ©jĂ Q framework of Chase and Meiklejohn (Eurocrypt 2014) and its extension by Wee (TCC 2016) to encryption primitives, thus relying on constant-size subgroup decisional assumptions. We show that the FC for linear functions are sufficiently powerful to solve four open problems. They, first, imply polynomial commitments, and, then, give cryptographic accumulators (i.e., an algebraic hash function which makes it possible to efficiently prove that some input belongs to a hashed set). In particular, specializing our FC construction leads to the first pairing-based polynomial commitments and accumulators for large universes known to achieve security under simple assumptions. We also substantially extend our pairing-based accumulator to handle subset queries which requires a non-trivial extension of the DĂ©jĂ Q framework
Born and Raised Distributively: Fully Distributed Non-Interactive Adaptively-Secure Threshold Signatures with Short Shares
International audienceThreshold cryptography is a fundamental distributed computational paradigm for enhancing the availability and the security of cryptographic public-key schemes. It does it by dividing private keys into shares handed out to distinct servers. In threshold signature schemes, a set of at least servers is needed to produce a valid digital signature. Availability is assured by the fact that any subset of servers can produce a signature when authorized. At the same time, the scheme should remain robust (in the fault tolerance sense) and unforgeable (cryptographically) against up to corrupted servers; {\it i.e.}, it adds quorum control to traditional cryptographic services and introduces redundancy. Originally, most practical threshold signatures have a number of demerits: They have been analyzed in a static corruption model (where the set of corrupted servers is fixed at the very beginning of the attack), they require interaction, they assume a trusted dealer in the key generation phase (so that the system is not fully distributed), or they suffer from certain overheads in terms of storage (large share sizes). In this paper, we construct practical {\it fully distributed} (the private key is born distributed), non-interactive schemes -- where the servers can compute their partial signatures without communication with other servers -- with adaptive security ({\it i.e.}, the adversary corrupts servers dynamically based on its full view of the history of the system). Our schemes are very efficient in terms of computation, communication, and scalable storage (with private key shares of size , where certain solutions incur storage costs at each server). Unlike other adaptively secure schemes, our schemes are erasure-free (reliable erasure is a hard to assure and hard to administer property in actual systems). To the best of our knowledge, such a fully distributed highly constrained scheme has been an open problem in the area. In particular, and of special interest, is the fact that Pedersen's traditional distributed key generation (DKG) protocol can be safely employed in the initial key generation phase when the system is born -- although it is well-known not to ensure uniformly distributed public keys. An advantage of this is that this protocol only takes one round optimistically (in the absence of faulty player)
Enhancing Cryptographic Security by Partial Key Management
Cryptographic security can degrade over time due to attackers using more powerful hardware or more sophisticated software. To maintain security, cryptographic machinery is replaced or strengthened as and when weaknesses are found. However, updating certain cryptographic components is infeasible or expensive, resulting in updates that either donât occur or are delayed. This disclosure describes techniques to enhance cryptographic security by updating portions of a cryptographic system when updating cryptographic parameters is only partially possible. Authenticating data (auth-data) sent by the un-updateable component during normal operation is used to deliver new and upgraded security parameters to secure communication. Security degradation resulting from the inability to effect an end-to-end update is limited to the immediate vicinity of the un-updateable component. The described techniques can be used to improve security of Internet-of-Things (IoT) device communication
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